



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Brazil: Resistance to President Goulart's political maneuverings appears to be solidifying.

Opposition elements in the military led by Army Chief of Staff Castello Branco are apparently working out plans for a move against Goulart, possibly this week.

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The anti-Goulart movement is to be centered initially in Sao Paulo, headquarters of the Second Army whose commander, Amaury Krueel, has indicated his sympathy for the movement. \*Army units in Minas Gerais state also are expected to collaborate.

Although the movement is spearheaded by the army, the plotters claim they have the support of certain naval and air force elements. They seem confident of their ability to neutralize military units considered loyal to the regime.

Meanwhile, several anti-Goulart governors are scheduled to meet in Porto Alegre in the next few days to formulate plans of their own. The Castello Branco forces apparently hope to coordinate their activities with the governors. The possibility that they will decide to make common cause cannot be ruled out.

Goulart's intervention in behalf of the several hundred naval and marine personnel involved in last week's leftist-inspired demonstration in Rio de Janeiro almost certainly was a major factor underlying the sense of urgency that marks the plotting now going on.

There are indications, however, that heavy criticism has forced Goulart to reconsider his decision, which apparently was made under pressure from the Communist-dominated General Workers Command (CGT). Whatever corrective steps may be taken, they

are unlikely to allay officer resentment over what is widely considered to be a deliberate effort by Goulart to undermine military discipline.

The CGT has instructed its members to prepare for a general strike as a counteraction to any military move against the government.

\*Goulart made it clear last night that he is not retreating and, in a speech in Rio de Janeiro, made an open bid for the loyalty of Brazil's non-commissioned officers. Goulart reaffirmed that he will continue to press for "basic reforms" and warned that he would "go to the streets and squares" for support if congress fails to pass his program.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Sino-Soviet Dispute: The Chinese Communists' latest challenge of Soviet leadership rules out any possibility of compromise.

Summarizing the eighth in their series of polemical answers to the open Soviet letter of last July, the Chinese characterize Khrushchev as the "greatest capitulationist of all time," and call on all parties to "repudiate and liquidate" his revisionism.

This vituperative Chinese statement--published in People's Daily and Red Flag today--demonstrates conclusively that the Rumanian effort to mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute or to dampen Chinese polemics was ineffectual.

The Chinese flatly declare that in any new world Communist conference they will refuse to compromise their views. They point out that in the 1957 and 1960 meetings they had compromised with the Soviet Union and accepted a draft resolution prepared by the USSR simply for the sake of unity. They proclaim that these resolutions must now be amended "through joint consultations."

The new Chinese statement makes it clear that a new conference could not even reaffirm the 1960 declaration. This adds support to the views expressed by the Italian party and others who had opposed Khrushchev's repeated requests for a conference on the grounds that it could only lead to a greater split or an unsatisfactory compromise.

Other West European parties, however, support Khrushchev's views, and the Dutch and French parties in the last week have called for a conference to be held "as soon as possible."

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DAILY BRIEF

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Congo: [Premier Adoula reportedly plans to reshuffle his cabinet soon and to dismiss politically powerful, pro-Western Defense Minister Anany.]

[Adoula is sensitive to public criticism that he has a "do-nothing" government, and to calls for greater efficiency and austerity. He also has desired for some time to weed out ministers he regards as incompetent or politically dangerous.]

[Adoula is reportedly irritated with Anany's free-wheeling maneuvers to promote himself and his Congolese Democratic Party. The premier is probably also aware of Anany's talk of mounting a coup. Anany was once considered a potential supporter of a pro-Adoula coalition party.]

[News of his likely exclusion from the cabinet might lead Anany to attempt a coup, although his plans do not appear far advanced. He has been highly critical of Adoula's dependence on "Binza group" support and believes himself most qualified to provide strong leadership for the Congolese Government. He claims to have considerable influence in the Congo Army, but he lacks the support of General Mobutu, the army commander.]

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTE

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Portugal - Communist China: Controlled Portuguese news media have devoted unusual attention to Communist China during the past week or so. The US Embassy has been told that this is traceable to a government "suggestion" that an effort be made to help prepare public opinion for recognition of Peiping in the near future. Portuguese - Chinese Communist talks on this question have been reported under way for some time, but it is not clear whether the present campaign is intended as a pressure tactic against the US or as a prelude to Lisbon's actually recognizing Peiping soon.

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DAILY BRIEF

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The Secretary of Defense

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